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 MEDIATING POST-CONFLICT DIALOGUE: 
THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE PROCESSES 
LISA J. LAPLANTE* 
KELLY PHENICIE** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
―Peru is like a double A battery: it lives permanently polarized,‖ a local 
journalist recently wrote in a Lima-based magazine.
1
  He wrote his 
observation nearly a decade after the conclusion of Peru‘s twenty-year 
internal armed conflict that began in 1980 in which state agents contributed to 
systematic and generalized human rights violations while fighting to defeat 
national subversive groups.  During this conflict, print and broadcast media 
parted from objectivity as it became obligated to take a stand on government 
actions, choosing to either defend them or, alternatively, resist and face 
backlash.  When Alberto Fujimori came to power in 1990, his authoritarian 
approach to national security included manipulation of the media intended to 
compel the public to support his repressive regime.
2
  Fujimori eventually fled 
the country in 2000 due to corruption scandals,
 3
 at which time a transitional 
government established the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(PTRC) and initiated criminal trials to prosecute human rights abusers.
4
  Yet, 
even after issuance of the PTRC‘s nine-volume report in 2003 and the 
conviction of key perpetrators,
5
 including Fujimori, Peru still suffers intense 
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1. José Villaorduña, Un chifa a que es culpable, DEDOMEDIO (Peru), Apr. 2009, at 18, 19 
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2. See infra Part III.A. 
3. See Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional 
Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT‘L L. 915, 919 (2009). 
4. Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the 
Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 143 (2007). 
5. PERUVIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM‘N, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
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polarization on issues regarding its past conflict.
6
  Notably, mass media plays 
a direct role in this ongoing societal tension. 
Indeed, for many post-conflict countries like Peru, the end of gunfire does 
not necessarily imply an end to internal conflict.  Remaining post-conflict 
societal friction may even be as threatening to long-lasting peace as the war 
itself.  This situation may be attributed, in part, to the media‘s failure to 
adequately mediate conflicting views of a country‘s history—its causes and 
consequences, its villains and heroes.  Certainly, newspapers, radio, and 
television, as well as the newly emerging micromedia (e.g., email) and middle 
media (e.g., web logs or ―blogs‖),7 reach huge audiences on a daily basis 
before, during, or after conflict.  As primary information sources in a 
democracy, these news outlets affect not only society‘s impression of what 
news and issues should receive attention, but also the perception of this 
information.  Given the great role that the media plays in shaping public 
opinion, it merits careful discussion. 
Certainly, the process of how a country transitions toward a peaceful 
democracy after episodes of political violence has earned significant and 
increasing attention and has even become its own field of study—transitional 
justice.  Up until now, the theory of transitional justice has offered a standard 
formula consisting of a combination of restorative and retributive justice 
through truth commissions, trials of human rights violators, and reform of 
political and legal institutions.
8
  These measures aim to foster reconciliation—
a form of ongoing conflict resolution and management—among not only 
opposing sides to the conflict, but also the citizens caught in their crossfire. 
Despite the plethora of academic and scholarly literature in the transitional 
justice field, the role and influence that the media has in these processes 
remain largely unexplored.  In response, this Article examines the weight of 
the media‘s impact on both societies in conflict and societies in post-conflict 
transition settings, including coverage of truth commission work and criminal 
trials.  It explores the case of Peru to show how media coverage of transitional 
justice processes, and the dialogue that ensues, can promote or hinder national 
 
6. See infra Part III.D. 
7. W. Lance Bennett has used the term ―micromedia‖ to describe e-mail and the term ―middle 
media‖ to describe blogs.  W. LANCE BENNETT, NEWS: THE POLITICS OF ILLUSION 8 (7th ed. 2007). 
8. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 921 (stating that definitions of transitional justice vary, but 
that trials serve an important purpose in the field of transitional justice); Laplante, supra note 4, at 
145 (quoting Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 79 (2003) 
(―[T]ransitional justice [is] ‗the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.‘‖)); 
Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de 
Justicia y Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 49, 50 (2006) (―By definition, transitional justice involves 
alternative approaches to conventional justice, thus provoking lively and at times contentious 
debate.‖). 
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reconciliation in post-conflict settings.  The Article contends that if 
reconciliation lays the foundation for preventing new cycles of violence, then 
transitional justice theory must begin considering how to attend to the media 
so that it exerts a positive influence on post-conflict recovery.  To initiate this 
new direction in the field, the Article examines the media through two 
important lenses: first, the way in which the media disseminates information 
about transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and trials, 
and the impact that this reporting has on increasing or decreasing local 
tensions; and second, how media institutions play a role in conflict and thus 
must be held accountable and subject to reform in transitional justice settings 
to ensure sustainable and peaceful democracies. 
Part II discusses transitional justice theory as it applies to post-conflict 
societies, paying particular attention to its overarching goal of reconciliation 
and long-term conflict resolution.  Part III explores the media‘s impact in 
conflict settings, using Peru as a case study, and suggests that conflict 
situations impact media institutions and that media institutions thus should 
become subject to reform.  Finally, Part IV identifies some of the ways in 
which systematic support or reform of the media may be approached based on 
the particular challenges facing post-conflict transitions. 
II.  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE THEORY AND ITS LIMITED DEBATE ON THE 
MEDIA 
After a society endures an internal armed conflict, repression, or other 
deviant political situations, how does it build or restore the rule of law, a 
culture of human rights, and democracy?  This question has shaped the 
evolution of the transitional justice field, which traces back to the Nuremberg 
trials in 1945 but gained particular salience during the post-Cold War era 
when numerous authoritarian and Communist states began to transition 
toward democracy.
9
  Over the past two decades, transitional justice theory has 
expanded and diversified through ongoing analysis and perspective on how to 
approach issues such as: How does the state provide redress to victims for the 
injustices brought against them?  What is the state‘s role in repairing victims 
or punishing oppressors?  How can citizens reconcile with their government 
and fellow citizens after being caught in crossfire?  Constrained by difficult 
and divisive political realities and pressured by demands for justice and 
accountability, states in transition have usually resorted to mechanisms like 
 
9. See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 3, at 920–31 (describing the history of transitional justice); 
see generally Roy Palmer Domenico, Italian Fascists on Trial, 1943–1948, in [2 COUNTRY STUDIES] 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 175, 184 
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (describing trials and investigations taking place in France and Italy during 
1944 and 1945). 
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truth commissions, reparations, institutional reform, and limited criminal trials 
with amnesties.
10
 
Typically, transitional justice projects use these mechanisms for the 
express purpose of achieving the overarching goals of reconciliation and 
finally sustainable peace.
11
  Very generally, reconciliation refers to 
―developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or 
formerly antagonistic persons or groups,‖12 and is both a process and an end 
point.  The PTRC viewed reconciliation as forming a new social pact with the 
marginalized citizens who suffered the most in the armed conflict; thus, it 
recommended the incorporation of inclusive and participatory channels into 
the country‘s democratic reforms.13  While the notion of reconciliation 
remains one of the least defined and most contested topics in transitional 
justice,
14
 it frequently embodies the idea of nonrepetition and prevention of 
new violence.
15
  This sentiment is reflected in common mottos coined to 
accompany transitional justice experiences, such as Peru‘s civil society slogan 
―Para que no se repita‖ (―So that it doesn‘t happen again‖), or the name of 
Argentinean truth commission report ―Nunca más‖ (―Never again‖).16  In 
essence, a post-conflict setting always potentially exists as a pre-conflict 
situation without the institution of certain measures to ensure peace.  The 
notion of national reconciliation thus points toward a thicker definition of 
conflict resolution and management in post-conflict settings.  As 
communication scholar Eytan Gilboa explains: 
The distinction between resolution and reconciliation is based 
on the assumption that even if parties to a conflict reach a 
 
10. See Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing 
the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework, 2 INT‘L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 331, 333 (2008) (―[R]emedies include[] prosecuting perpetrators of human 
rights violations, revealing the truth about past crimes, providing victims/survivors with reparations 
and reforming governmental institutions.‖); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: 
CONFRONTING STATE TERROR & ATROCITY 155 (2001). 
11. See HAYNER, supra note 10, at 11 (―A state may have a number of objectives in responding 
to past abuses: to punish perpetrators, establish the truth, repair or address damages, pay respect to 
victims, and prevent further abuses.  There may be other aims as well, such as promoting national 
reconciliation and reducing conflict over the past . . . .‖). 
12. Id. at 155.  Reconciliation as a concept is commonly associated with the notion of 
forgiveness between victims and perpetrators due to the South African Truth & Reconciliation 
Commission‘s heavy emphasis on religious pardons.  See id. 
13. See Lisa J. Laplante, The Peruvian Truth Commission’s Historical Memory Project: 
Empowering Truth-Tellers to Confront Truth Deniers, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 433, 439 (2007). 
14. See Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in 
Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 661, 665–66 (2004) (stating that the definition 
of reconciliation varies by country). 
15. See Laplante, supra note 10, at 332. 
16. Id.; Para Que No Se Repita, http://www.paraquenoserepita.org.pe/ (last visited Dec. 2, 
2009). 
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peace agreement, it is only an agreement between leaders, not 
between peoples, and that to be effective it must be fully 
implemented and respected over time. Successful conflict 
resolution ends with a formal peace agreement (negative 
peace), while successful reconciliation ends with a positive or 
stable peace.
17
 
 
Building on Gilboa‘s distinction, transitional justice encompasses more 
than just the cessation of warfare—it aims to establish and build deeper 
institutional and inter-societal reforms toward lasting peace.
18
  Indeed, it is 
often generalized popular dissatisfaction with the performance of state 
institutions, combined with the state‘s failure to provide democratic channels 
to hear and respond to these complaints, that give rise to social grievances and 
cause such protest to become violent.
19
  Thus, transitional justice promotes 
addressing these flint-like issues at their roots, requiring reform and the 
population‘s ability to agree on its past.  For example, truth commissions seek 
to create a collective memory and consensus among a population
20
 that is 
often still divided in the wake of conflict; trials and reparations seek to reveal 
wrongdoing and settle accounts so as to quiet vengeful tendencies; and 
institutional reform aims to repair legal and political institutions to ensure that 
the rule of law and democracy operates properly to resolve conflicts.
21
 
Strikingly absent in transitional justice scholarship, however, is discussion 
of the role, as well as possible reform of, media institutions and systems in the 
transitional justice processes that play out in post-conflict societies.
22
  This 
gap in the literature comes as no surprise considering that the role of the 
media in conflict and post-conflict settings remains a relatively unexplored 
area of research across all disciplines, even that of media communications 
study.
23
  However, this lack of study on the role of the media in conflict and 
post-conflict societies does not mean the media has a limited impact in these 
situations.  On the contrary, ―[m]edia can positively influence reconciliation 
 
17. Eytan Gilboa, Media and International Conflict: A Multidisciplinary Approach, 2007 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 229, 232. 
18. See Laplante, supra note 10, at 332–33. 
19. See id. at 337 (―[V]iolence flows from persistent socioeconomic inequalities, coupled with 
a lack of effective channels of redress.‖). 
20. See Laplante & Theidon, supra note 8, at 91. 
21. See HAYNER, supra note 10, at 11 (listing the aims of transitional justice programs). 
22. For example, Priscilla Hayner‘s book now stands as a standard text in the field of 
transitional justice but mentions media only five times, once to mention possible secondary trauma 
suffered by journalists covering the truth commission hearings, id. at 152, and the other times to 
mention when the media covered a truth commission closely, id. at 42, 100, 225–26.  There is limited 
analysis and no suggestion of the need to directly address the institution of media as part of reform 
efforts in post-conflict settings.  See id. at 42, 100, 152, 225–26. 
23. See Gilboa, supra note 17, at 229. 
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in the aftermath of violent conflict just as the negative use of the media 
magnifies and promotes conflict.‖24  Furthermore, as the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) recognized, ―building a free and 
independent media is integral to creating an open and civil society as well as 
fostering peace and reconciliation.‖25  Yet, given that the media tends to suffer 
direct attacks on its independence both during and after conflict,
26
 the media 
faces difficult and unique challenges in the conflict recovery process. 
III.  THE MEDIA IN TIMES OF CONFLICT 
The role of the media in conflict settings may be too often underestimated.  
Indeed, the media has great potential to either incite or calm societal tensions.  
Consider, for example, how at the same time that some journalists take great 
risks to assure full coverage of controversial issues like political violence, 
corruption, and human rights violations, other national journalists directly 
assist in the commission of these egregious crimes.  For example, Rwanda 
became a ―textbook example‖ of the media used ―to encourage and sustain 
genocidal tendencies.‖27  Specifically, the private broadcast company Libre 
des Mille Collines and the national Radio Rwanda took active roles in 
fomenting ethnic hatred among citizens, driving the Hutu people to kill at 
least a half-million of the Tutsi population in 1994.
28
  Similarly, the media 
played a central role in fueling ethnic tensions in the Balkan wars, in which 
the Serbian state controlled the media to promote its campaign against 
Kosavar Albanians, assuring that journalists who took ―views contrary to the 
official perspective . . . were routinely harassed, mostly unread or unheard, 
and did little to change public opinion.‖29 
The recently concluded civil war in Sri Lanka, where an estimated 70,000 
to 80,000 civilians were killed over the course of three decades, offers another 
example of how the media plays an integral role in influencing public 
 
24. Ellen Yamshon & Daniel Yamshon, Comics Media in Conflict Resolution Programs: Are 
They Effective in Promoting and Sustaining Peace?, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 421, 425 (2006). 
25. Monroe E. Price, Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives: 
The Experience of Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 31 (2000). 
26. See, e.g., infra notes 74–81, 88–97, 125–34 and accompanying text. 
27. Price, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
28. See Alison Des Forges, Silencing the Voices of Hate in Rwanda, in FORGING PEACE: 
INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MEDIA SPACE 236, 236 (Monroe E. 
Price & Mark Thompson eds., 2002) [hereinafter FORGING PEACE]; see also Phyllis E. Bernard, 
Eliminationist Discourse in a Conflicted Society: Lessons for America from Africa?, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 173, 191–200 (2009). 
29. Price, supra note 25, at 5; see also Lynn M. Malley, Observations from an American 
Conflict Resolution Professional in Serbia on the Effects of the Accessibility of International Media, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 241, 247–48 (2009). 
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opinion.
30
  Sri Lanka features three functioning languages: the majority 
population speaks Sinhalese, the main minority groups speak Tamil, and the 
working language is English.
31
  The media divides along the same lines.
32
  In 
this way, the war between government forces and the separatist-group 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE) managed to extend to the 
press.
33
  The Sinhalese media mainly backed the Sri Lankan military and its 
push to destroy the LTTE,
34
 whereas the Tamil media covered the effects of 
the war on the Tamil population, and, in some cases, supported the LTTE.
35
  
The English-language media was divided between the state-owned media 
house, which produced mainly pro-government propaganda, and a handful of 
independent papers that often self-censored for fear of repression.
36
  During 
the final stages of Sri Lanka‘s civil war, no journalists were actually allowed 
into the war zone, resulting in an utter lack of professional firsthand accounts 
to explain what exactly was happening.  This total blackout meant that few 
official sources outside of the government existed. 
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a Sri Lankan think tank, 
released a media-monitoring report examining coverage during the final 
months of the war, from January through April.
37
  The CPA found that due to 
polarized media coverage, Sri Lankans learned very different things about the 
war and thus formed different perceptions depending on the media coverage 
available to their ethnicity and language.
38
  The Tamil media used more 
sources and covered war-related civilian death and disasters.
39
  On the other 
hand, the (mostly government-run) English and Sinhalese media relied almost 
exclusively on state sources and only included information approved by 
authorities,
40
 who had a different focus from the Tamil media: 
 
30. The authors thank distinguished international journalist Jesse Hardman for sharing this 
information about Sri Lanka, where he trained local journalists in 2008. 
31. See Cent. Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2008, Sri Lanka, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html. 
32. See Media React to Sri Lanka ―Victory,‖ BBC News (May 19, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8056787.stm (listing some of the different language 
newspapers and how the newspapers covered the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka). 
33. See, e.g., id. 
34. See CTR. FOR POL‘Y ALTERNATIVES, KEY TRENDS FROM MEDIA MONITORING: JANUARY 
TO APRIL 2009, http://www.cpalanka.org/mediamonitoring2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/key-
trends-jan-to-apr-2009.pdf. 
35. See id. 
36. See id.  As part of its coverage of Sri Lanka‘s war, the BBC printed excerpts from the 
different Sri Lankan media as the war ended.  See Media React to Sri Lanka ―Victory,‖ supra note 
32. 
37. See CTR. FOR POL‘Y ALTERNATIVES, supra note 34. 
38. See id. 
39. See id.  All civilian casualties in the northern war front were Tamil.  Id. 
40. See id. 
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What was mostly revealed through the information provided 
by the authorities was either transportation of essential 
commodities or the harassments that the civilians [were] 
facing under the LTTE.  It was only the Tamil media which 
reported on the loss of lives[,] injuries, dearth of food and 
medicine and many other grievances that the people [were] 
suffering, in addition to such information provided.  For this 
they were depending on the sources such as [web site] 
reports, foreign media reports and the statements of local and 
international institutions and individuals[,] etc.
41
 
 
For Sri Lankans to get a more complete picture of what exactly went on 
during the last stages of the war, they had to read multiple newspapers and 
web sites and then somehow discern what to believe. 
Certainly, the role that the media carries out during conflict can have a 
major impact on society, greatly influencing the aggravation or the abatement 
of opposing sentiments.  In fact, due to this immense power the media has 
over society‘s perceptions, the manipulation of the media is almost always a 
primary tool for repressive political leaders and warlords.
42
  In these 
exceptionally complex settings, journalists often face significant limits on 
their abilities to successfully practice their profession.  New York Times editor 
and Pulitzer Prize winner Tina Rosenberg observes: ―In many countries, 
journalists must also contend with laws that make libel a criminal offense, and 
use a very broad standard to define libel.  Venezuela criminalizes expression 
deemed disrespectful to public officials even if completely true.‖43  The 
media‘s experience during Peru‘s conflict resembles this pattern and offers an 
important look at how both extremes—positive and negative journalism—
play out in both conflict and post-conflict settings. 
A.  The Media in Peru’s Conflict 
Peruvian journalists and the media had important roles from the start of 
Peru‘s internal armed conflict, which the self-declared Maoist group Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL), led by Abimael Guzmán, ignited when it 
took up arms against the state in 1980.
44
  Capitalizing on the Peruvian poor‘s 
 
41. CTR. FOR POL‘Y ALTERNATIVES, CPA MEDIA MONITORING IN 2009: CHANNEL 4 AND 
HUMANITARIAN REPORTAGE, June 1, 2009, http://www.cpalanka.org/ 
mediamonitoring2009/?p=197#more-197. 
42. See Price, supra note 25, at 1; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 69–97. 
43. Tina Rosenberg, The Long, Hard Road of Investigative Reporting in Latin America, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 9. 
44. See NELSON MANRIQUE GÁLVEZ, EL TIEMPO DEL MIEDO: LA VIOLENCIA POLITICA EN EL 
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rising popular dissatisfaction with socioeconomic conditions, SL conducted a 
vigorous recruiting campaign in the rural highlands,
45
 increasing its influence 
while spreading fear and terror.  With most of the battle occurring far from the 
coastal capital of Lima, many Peruvians remained ignorant of the violence‘s 
extent and the lives it claimed.
46
  In fact, ―in part because the war was still a 
mystery to many urban Peruvians,‖ eight journalists began a trip on  
January 26, 1983, from Lima to Ayacucho, as ―an expedition in search of the 
‗truth.‘‖47  They had planned to ―investigate rumors that the ‗Indians‘ had 
been killing the Senderistas,‖48 or SL members, by traveling to the village of 
Huaychao.
49
  Yet in the course of their trip, they passed through a town named 
Uchuraccay where they were brutally murdered.
50
  The causes for and events 
surrounding the journalists‘ murders are still a subject of heated debate.51  
However, the violent case of Uchuraccay succeeded for the first time in 
raising national awareness of the rising violence in Peru.
52
  For many, the case 
of Uchuraccay marked the initiation of the conflict in rural Peru because until 
then, ―the violence had not captured significant national attention.‖53 
Under similarly ambiguous circumstances, 135 inhabitants of Uchuraccay 
also were murdered in the months following the journalists‘ deaths, caught 
between attacks by SL, repression from state forces, and protection measures 
of the local rondas campesinas (rural self-defense committees).
54
  Yet these 
deaths would not be discovered until the investigations of the PTRC nearly 
two decades later.
55
  The PTRC considered the case of Uchuraccay to be ―an 
emblematic example of the violence and pain in the country‘s collective 
memory.‖56  Just as a ―20-year oblivion‖ blanketed the deaths of the 
Uchuraccay inhabitants, the only explanations given for the journalists‘ 
murders resulted from ―controversial investigations that failed to clarify the 
 
PERÚ 1980–1996, at 14 (2002).  The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) soon followed 
as a lesser force in 1983.  See Laplante, supra note 3, at 945 n.155. 
45. MANRIQUE, supra note 44, at 14. 
46. See Kimberly Theidon, Histories of Innocence: Post-War Stories in Peru, in LOCALIZING 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw, 
Lars Waldorf & Pierre Hazan eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 8, on file with the authors). 
47. Id. 
48. Kimberly Theidon, “How We Learned To Kill our Brother”?: Memory, Mortality and 
Reconciliation in Peru, 29 BULLETIN DE L‘INSTITUT FRANÇAIS D‘ÉTUDES ANDINES [BULL. INST. 
FR. ÉTUDES ANDINES] 539, 543 (2000) (Peru). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 544. 
52. See Theidon, supra note 46 (manuscript at 8). 
53. Id. 
54. 5 PTRC, supra note 5, at 121. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. (authors‘ trans.). 
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reason for their deaths.‖57 
As depicted in the case of Uchuraccay, the confusing nature of the 
guerrilla-style war, as well as the government‘s failure to understand it, led to 
vast human rights violations, including murder, mass graves, extrajudicial 
executions, forced disappearances, widespread gender violence, torture, and 
many other examples of brutality as much against the combatants as the 
innocent bystanders.
58
  Yet, the fact that the victims were journalists 
distinguishes the Uchuraccay case because their untimely deaths resulted from 
their protagonist roles in assuring transparency and truth about the conflict.  
Though it is true that ―the media take[s] on greater responsibility as the public 
reflexively turns to [it] for clarification, and at times even for direction‖59 
during times of conflict, it is this very burden that puts journalists‘ lives at 
risk.  Importantly in the Uchuraccay case, it was the journalists‘ diligent 
efforts to provide information on the conflict and their resulting martyrdom 
that revealed the conflict‘s severity to those in Lima, including the Peruvian 
government.
60
  In turn, the national press ―actively participated in the dispute 
on the facts,‖ giving rise to national awareness on the weight of the expanding 
internal armed conflict.
61
 
Despite the pronounced risks, journalists continued to play a critical role 
in Peru‘s conflict into the 1990s, when Alberto Fujimori came to power.  
Fujimori was elected in 1990 despite his relative political obscurity because 
many Peruvians believed he represented the change they so desperately 
awaited.
62
  A stifling economic crisis coupled with the ominous spread of 
terrorism
63
 made the population especially willing to accept harsh measures 
that would immediately and visibly improve daily life.  In this context, 
Fujimori‘s government was easily able to slide toward authoritarianism and 
 
57. Id. (authors‘ trans.). 
58. See generally 1 PTRC, supra note 5. 
59. Claude Salhani, Media in Conflict: Inciting Violence in Kosovo, 7 GEO. J. INT‘L AFF. 33, 37 
(2006). 
60. See Theidon, supra note 48 at 543; Theidon, supra note 46 (manuscript at 8). 
61. 5 PTRC, supra note 5, at 156 (authors‘ trans.). 
62. With his motto of ―[h]onesty, technology and work,‖ and playing on the existing image of 
the Japanese as hardworking and decent, Alberto Fujimori seemed to embody this change.  See 
SALLY BOWEN, EL EXPEDIENTE FUJIMORI: PERÚ Y SU PRESIDENTE 1990–2000, at 13 (Richard 
Bauer ed., 2000) (authors‘ trans.).  As a political ―outsider‖ and ethnic minority, he particularly 
appealed to certain sectors of Peruvian society that had been traditionally marginalized by 
mainstream politics.  See Steven Levitsky, Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru, J. DEMOCRACY 
78, 82 (1999). 
63. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 945 (noting that Alan García‘s first term, from 1985 to 1990, 
plunged the country into an economic crisis, with inflation rising to 2 million percent).  See 
MANRIQUE, supra note 44, at 51; Laplante, supra note 3, at 945.  In this context, the violence that 
prevailed in the rural areas slowly began to seep into the capital.  Car bombs and electrical blackouts, 
once unfamiliar, soon became commonplace in Lima. 
2009] MEDIA IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 261 
corruption.  Fujimori gained worldwide notoriety when he conducted a  
self-coup in April 1992, during which he dismantled the Congress, judiciary, 
and Constitutional Congress.
64
  He used his expanded executive powers to 
issue draconian antiterrorism laws and create what was later discovered to be 
a military death squad to carry out extrajudicial executions of suspected 
terrorists.
65
  In fact, as early as 1991, Fujimori‘s administration faced national 
and international scrutiny when state armed forces were suspected of 
conducting two massacres: the Barrios Altos in 1991 (a neighborhood 
fundraiser where fifteen people were executed) and La Cantuta in July 1992 
(a university where nine students and a professor were kidnapped and 
murdered).
66
 
Despite early indications of state involvement in these tragic events, the 
government repeatedly changed its official story, first blaming SL, then 
blaming alleged rogue state agents.  Ultimately, it took investigative 
journalism to uncover the truth and put pressure on the state to investigate the 
wrongdoing.
67
  For example, the magazine Sí first provided evidence that the 
executors were actually part of a government-led death squad unofficially 
known as Colina.
68
  Some of the media not only maintained the national 
spotlight on the government‘s abuses, but also created an ongoing record of 
Fujimori‘s regime, which would eventually be used in the trial against him to 
prove his role in human rights abuses and corruption.
69
  Yet, the vigilance of 
journalists did not come without challenge and opposition. 
Indeed, the commendable contribution of some of Peru‘s journalists must 
be understood within the larger scheme of the Fujimori government to use the 
media to maintain its stronghold while cultivating a culture of fear.  This 
technique was the brainchild of Fujimori‘s top advisor and ―spy-chief,‖ 
Vladimiro Montesinos, who was inspired by Adolf Hitler‘s Mein Kempf and 
 
64. Laplante, supra note 3, at 945. 
65. Id. at 946–47.  In Fujimori‘s human rights trial, Supreme Court judges determined that this 
was part of his counterterrorism strategy.  See Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de 
la República [CSJR] [Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic], 07/04/2009, 
―Luis Antonio León Borja y otros v. Alberto Fujimori Fujimori / asesinato, lesiones y secuestro‖ 
(Peru), available at http://www.pj.gob.pe/noticias/noticias.asp?codigo=10410&opcion=detalle  
[hereinafter Fujimori Human Rights Trial]. 
66. Laplante, supra note 3, at 947–50. 
67. See id. at 950.  Due to international and national pressure, Fujimori eventually initiated 
trials against members of the Colina death squad.  Id. at 951–52.  However, after he was reelected in 
1995, Fujimori issued amnesty laws, freeing state agents who had been imprisoned for rights abuses 
since 1980.  Id. at 953–54.  With this law, Colina members were pardoned, freeing them of their 
conviction for the La Cantuta massacre.  Id. at 954. 
68. See id. at 950. 
69. Fujimori Human Rights Trial, supra note 65, at 77. 
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the Nazis‘ use of media control to keep a tight rein over the population.70  For 
example, Fujimori and Montesinos used bribes and blackmail, obligating 
media outlets to take a favorable position on Fujimiori‘s government.71  The 
government even had a military operation—―Plan Bermuda‖—that 
specifically persecuted key members of the opposition and journalists.
72
  Only 
a handful of news organizations resisted this pressure throughout Fujimori‘s 
regime, most notably Caretas, La República, and El Comercio.
73
   
But the stakes for remaining independent were high.  For example, for 
refusing a bribe from Montesinos to withhold an article portraying the advisor 
as ―Fujimori‘s Rasputin,‖ Enrique Zileri, the director of influential political 
magazine Caretas, was taken to court and required to pay a substantial fine.
74
  
Given that Fujimori‘s scheme included bribing judges, the judiciary became a 
powerful weapon against those who refused to comply with the invitation to 
cooperate.
75
  Even today, there still exists a marked rivalry between Fujimori 
and newspapers like Caretas, which never abandoned its staunch  
anti-Fujimori reporting, and, as a consequence, were frequent victims of his 
authoritarian controls.
76
 
While a handful of national newspapers managed to maintain some level 
of independence, another sector of the local media succumbed to the 
government‘s pressures.  Specifically, Fujimori capitalized on the existence of 
chicha newspapers, a genre of press that arose as a result of the large-scale 
migration of Peruvians from the sierra to Lima after the violence in the 
1980s.
77
  Written largely for undereducated populations, chicha newspapers 
used a less formal style of writing, published sensationalized or even vulgar 
news, and often displayed pictures of scantily dressed women.
78
  Recognizing 
the mass acceptance of these chicha among lower social sectors, Fujimori and 
his supporters bought them with bribes in exchange for the chicha‘s 
 
70. SALLY BOWEN & JANE HOLLIGAN, EL ESPÍA IMPERFECTO: LA TELARAÑA SINIESTRA DE 
VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS 42 (2003). 
71. See, e.g., John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru, 
18 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 79, 81 tbl.4, 82, 84 (2004) (describing the blackmail and bribery that took 
place during Fujimori‘s presidency and listing bribes paid to media outlets). 
72. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 351. 
73. See McMillan & Zoido, supra note 71, at 84; César Arias Quincot, La Infame Década del 
Fujimorato, in CÓMO FUJIMORI JODIÓ AL PERÚ 29, 59 (Carlos Milla Batres ed., 2001). 
74. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 342–43. 
75. See, e.g., McMillan & Zoido, supra note 71, at 77, 80 tbl.3 (describing and listing bribes 
paid to members of the judiciary). 
76. Id. at 84 (describing how the Fujimori government harassed these newspapers through libel 
suits, incarceration, death threats, and by discrediting the independent journalists in articles written in 
the media outlets that the Fujimori government had already bribed). 
77. See generally JUAN GARGUREVICH, LA PRENSA SENSACIONALISTA EN EL PERÚ 245–94 
tbl.6 (2002) (authors‘ trans.). 
78. Id. at 13. 
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publication of stories that favored Fujimori and attacked his political 
opposition, including critical journalists from news outlets that tried to 
maintain independence.
79
  In various cases, this submissiveness to the regime 
was actually a ―strategy for survival.‖80  Overburdened with large outstanding 
debts, some media outlets found themselves obligated to accept bribes.
81
 
―Smokescreens‖ (cortinas de humo) were another common tactic of 
Fujimori‘s government to maintain and increase civilian support of his 
repressive rule.
82
  This involved feeding journalists trivial pieces of news that 
would be strategically blown out of proportion to distract the population from 
more pressing issues.
83
  In this way, Fujimori‘s government employed 
techniques like ―political spin, sensation, and insider buzz‖ to shape the daily 
news, thus denying citizens ―a solid basis for critical thinking or effective 
action.‖84  One of the earliest and most representative examples of these 
smokescreens was the ―Crying Virgin.‖85  In the district of Callao in 1991, a 
statue of the Virgin Mary was said to be found crying real tears.
86
  With all of 
Lima‘s attention on its neighboring miracle, the cholera epidemic that killed 
many people in lower classes nearly went unnoticed.
87
 
Meanwhile, Montesinos also controlled television programming by 
offering large bribes to station owners.  This strategy sought to promote 
―‗political reeducation‘ or perverse, authoritative politicizing.‖88  For 
example, Fujimori used a popular talk show hosted by Laura Bozzo to bolster 
his regime.
89
  On the contrary, when station owner Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, a 
dual citizen of Israeli birth, refused to capitulate to this pressure, Fujimori‘s 
government stripped him of his Peruvian citizenship, forcing Ivcher to leave 
the country.
90
  Through this type of extensive manipulation of television 
 
79. See CARLOS IVÁN DEGREGORI, LA DÉCADA DE LA ANTIPOLÍTICA: AUGE Y HUÍDA DE 
ALBERTO FUJIMORI Y VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS 173 (2000).  Examples of chicha newspapers 
include EL MAÑANERO, EL CHINO, LA CHUCHI, EL TÍO, and EL CHATO.  McMillan & Zoido, supra 
note 71, at 79. 
80. DEGREGORI, supra note 79, at 114 n.2 (authors‘ trans.). 
81. See BOWEN, supra note 62, at 342–43; DEGREGORI, supra note 79, at 114 n.2 (authors‘ 
trans.). 
82. See Jo-Marie Burt, “Quien Habla Es Terroista”: The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori’s 
Peru, 41 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 32, 53 (2006). 
83. See id. (describing how counterinsurgency operations were used as a smokescreen to cover 
up the Fujimori government‘s crimes). 
84. See BENNETT, supra note 7, at xvi. 
85. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 340. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. DEGREGORI, supra note 79, at 115 (authors‘ trans.). 
89. Id. (authors‘ trans.). 
90. Bronstein eventually resorted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to seek 
relief, resulting in a judgment by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  Ivcher Bronstein v. 
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programs and televised news, it became difficult to distinguish government-
fabricated news from real news.  For example, in a trial against him in August 
1996, well-known druglord Demetrio Chávez Peñaherrera, nicknamed 
―Vaticano,‖ testified that Montesinos gave him $50,000 each month between 
July 1991 and August 1992 to use an air landing strip in a drug-trafficking 
zone of the Peruvian jungle.
91
  However, under suspicious circumstances, 
Vaticano reappeared the following day, and—stuttering—retracted what he 
had first testified, deactivating possible investigations of Montesinos.
92
  There 
was later evidence that Vaticano had been tortured,
93
 as were many who 
criticized the government, making it even more difficult to distinguish which 
news could be trusted and which news was manipulated. 
Over time, the field of information in Peru turned into a ―dumbing 
propagandistic monologue manufactured by mercenaries of the pen, voice and 
image, whose intention was to keep Peruvians in the idolatry of the regime.‖94  
The media grew ―debased through bribes and through fear, instrumenting 
campaigns to manipulate public opinion.‖95  Indeed, one of Fujimori‘s most 
powerful media tricks was to sustain the perceived threat of terrorism to 
maintain public support for his draconian and otherwise unlawful activity.  He 
employed a common technique among political actors to ―use . . . myths, 
stereotypes, scapegoats, and other symbolic devices‖96 to influence the 
public‘s perceptions.  It has been observed that 
 
[W]hen the media tell such stories because they fit the news 
values that organizations are looking for, there are few 
restraints on the fabrication of political reality.  Under such 
circumstances, political actors can manage issues, conflicts, 
and crises by simply throwing symbols at them—symbols 
that may be irrelevant to the matters at hand yet provoke 
powerful emotional responses from the public.
97
 
 
 
Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 20/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997), 
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/Peru111762.htm.  See also Case of Ivcher-
Bronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 (Sept. 24, 1999), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_54_ing.pdf. 
91. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 268. 
92. Regreso con Roncha, CARETAS (Peru), Apr. 10, 2003, available at 
http://www.caretas.com.pe/2003/1767/articulos/roncha.phtml (authors‘ trans.). 
93. Id. 
94. Mario Vargas Llosa, Cómo Fujimori Jodió al Perú, in CÓMO FUJIMORI JODIÓ AL PERÚ, 
supra note 73, at 15, 17 (authors‘ trans.). 
95. Id. (authors‘ trans.). 
96. Author W. Lance Bennett argues that there is always a temptation for politicians to use 
―myths, stereotypes, scapegoats, and other symbolic devices.‖  BENNETT, supra note 7, at 105. 
97. Id. 
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Similarly, Fujimori fabricated his own news, reproduced by the majority of 
media outlets, to shape popular opinion toward supporting his questionable 
regime. 
Ironically, despite all of these controls, it was the national media that 
caused the demise of Fujimori‘s regime in 2000.  A group of congressmen and 
journalists from the opposition called a press conference to show one of 
thousands of ―vladivideos‖98—the term for videos showing Montesinos 
bribing hundreds of powerful elites, including members of the press, Peruvian 
Congress, business community, entertainment industry, and other spheres of 
influence.
99
  The video event, fully covered by the broadcast and print media, 
unleashed an incredible scandal, serving as proof of what many had long 
suspected and attempted to prove in vain: the extent to which Peru‘s 
democracy and society had been corrupted.  Fujimori staged a dramatic 
manhunt of Montesinos, who had fled to Panama, and aired a broadcast that 
featured him confiscating the remaining videos from Montesinos‘ home.100  
Soon after, on November 13, 2000, Fujimori fled the country under the 
pretext of attending an international conference, only to fax his resignation 
from Japan where he would reside for the next five years.
101
  From there, he 
ran a weekly radio program to maintain his political base, one that would 
continue to support him even up until and after his criminal conviction in 
2009.
102
 
In the wake of Fujimori‘s departure, the transitional government 
embarked on its transitional justice project by establishing the PTRC in 2001 
to begin investigations into the internal armed conflict and Fujimori‘s 
authoritarian regime.
103
  The PTRC‘s two-year investigation concluded with 
the publication of its nine-volume Final Report, in which it detailed 
systematic human rights violations since 1980.
104
  It estimated that 70,000 
people had been killed, disproportionately impacting the poor, rural, 
 
98. McMillan & Zoido, supra note 71, at 71, 89. 
99. Id. at 71. 
100. John R. Hamilton, The Fall of Fujimori: A Diplomat’s Perspective, 30 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 191, 200–04 (2006); Clifford Krauss, Playing Cat and Mouse, with Copters, in Peru, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at A10. 
101. Laplante, supra note 3, at 957; Hamilton, supra note 100, at 208. 
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Peru.  For instance, a February 2008 survey conducted while he was on trial for human rights 
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Debate on Fujimori‘s Presidency (May 13, 2009), http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=616. 
103. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 919. 
104. See generally PTRC, supra note 5. 
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indigenous farmers.
105
  The PTRC recognized that its mission included 
educating the country about the massive human rights violations that occurred 
during Peru‘s ―war on terrorism.‖106  This task depended on media outreach, 
an observation the PTRC learned by studying previous truth commissions 
around the world.
107
 
B.  The Media and Truth Commissions 
Transitional justice projects inevitably rely on the media to reach their 
goals of disseminating the truth about a dark period of a country‘s history.  
Certainly, given the central role that the media plays in keeping citizens 
informed and shaping public opinion in democratic societies,
108
 it is inevitable 
that the media would also influence the public‘s impression of the work of 
transitional justice mechanisms and the information the transitional justice 
mechanisms seek to impart.  Indeed, news making is ―agenda setting‖ because 
it influences what the ―public regards as important for them to think about in 
society and politics.‖109 
An example of the media‘s agenda-setting power can be seen in the way 
Spain‘s local media renewed public interest in righting past abuses after a 
twenty-year ―pact of forgetting.‖110  Dictator General Francisco Franco came 
to power in Spain after a gruesome civil war from 1936 to 1939 between 
Franco‘s Nationalist forces and the Spanish Republicans, resulting in more 
than 300,000 deaths.
111
  Upon winning the war, Franco instated a repressive 
dictatorship, which lasted until his death in 1975.
112
  During that time, an 
estimated 440,000 Republicans went into exile, and another 400,000 remained 
in Spain and were subjected to imprisonment or forced labor.
113
  The 
Republicans were also systematically attacked by the regime through the 
media and educational systems that ―portrayed the defeated Republicans as 
bloodthirsty traitors against Spain.‖114  Yet, upon Franco‘s death, Spanish 
society virtually buried his government‘s abuses against the ―defeated 
enemy,‖ opting to forget the past rather than carry out truth commissions and 
 
105. HATUN WILLAKUY, VERSIÓN ABREVIADA DEL INFORME FINAL DE LA COMISIÓN DE LA 
VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN 434 (2004). 
106. Laplante, supra note 4, at 147–48. 
107. See id. at 148. 
108. BENNETT, supra note 7, at 2. 
109. Id. at 8. 
110. See Madeleine Davis, Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?: Breaking the Pacto del Olvido, 
27 HUM. RTS. Q. 858, 873–74 (2005). 
111. Id. at 860. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 862. 
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trials to redress wrongdoings.
115
 
However, local media coverage of the extradition proceedings brought 
against Chile‘s former dictator Augusto Pinochet, who had traveled to 
England in 1998 for medical treatment, reignited interest in seeking 
accountability about the truth and human rights violations.
116
  Spanish Judge 
Baltazar Garzón Real‘s petition to extradite Pinochet for alleged human rights 
crimes against Spanish citizens roused the country‘s collective memory of its 
own dictator.
117
  As the Spanish press began to draw parallels with Franco, 
Spain began to reexamine its own conflict and post-conflict periods.
118
  
Eventually, journalists and academics helped beckon in a delayed transitional 
justice project through advocating the importance of ―reactivating 
memory,‖119 which led to the exhumation of mass graves, the identification of 
victims‘ remains, literature, and museum exhibits on the war.120  In essence, 
the local media was able to awaken the society‘s quest for the truth, a need 
that had gone largely underground. 
Spain‘s experience speaks of the effort to construct collective narratives 
and interpretations of the past.  One of the key roles that the media plays in 
transitional justice settings, as exemplified by Spain, is facilitating public 
debate and deliberation on difficult truths about a collective past.
121
  Yet, 
arriving at a collective memory of the past is one of the greatest challenges 
facing a post-conflict society because it implies reaching a consensus in a 
polarized context.
122
  While truth commissions attempt to present an objective 
account of the events of a society‘s repressive or violent past, they inevitably 
contend with multiple perspectives and interpretations of this history.  In 
essence, truth commissions must mediate this conflict to bring society to a 
shared version of this past, which arguably entails a society-wide admission 
that egregious human rights violations occurred and that victims must be 
acknowledged.  However, for this end to result, truth commissions rely on the 
media to encourage consensus-making about the past—a daunting task. 
A report on the media and conflict prevention issued by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
contends that the media have the opportunity to provide a safe battleground to 
 
115. See id. at 862–66. 
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121. See, e.g., id. 
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(2001). 
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―help[] . . . transform destructive conflicts into non-destructive debates.‖123  In 
theory, the findings of truth commissions, if transmitted through newspapers, 
television, and radio, can encourage dialogue while also raising recognition of 
how citizens, and society in general, suffered as a consequence of the 
breakdown of the rule of law and violations of human rights.  Transitional 
justice scholars argue that reconciliation can only follow once this collective 
memory has been attained.
124
 
The transitional justice experience in South Africa exemplifies the critical 
role that the media can play in assuring that a truth commission‘s work enters 
the public domain for full debate and discussion.  South Africa undertook its 
transitional justice process to address almost fifty years of apartheid  
(1948–1994) by establishing its Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(SATRC) in 1995.
125
  The SATRC‘s public hearings, where victims publicly 
gave testimony, enjoyed both extensive media coverage and ample public 
interest.
126
  Truth Commission Deputy Chairman Alex Boraine wrote: 
Unlike many other truth commissions, this one was center 
stage, and the media coverage, particularly radio, enabled the 
poor, the illiterate, and people living in rural areas to 
participate in its work so that it was truly a national 
experience rather than restricted to a small handful of selected 
commissioners.
127
 
 
Thus the media made the SATRC‘s work more accessible to diverse sectors of 
society. 
In contrast to South Africa‘s experience, the PTRC received limited media 
attention and arguably failed to create a report accepted by all sides of the 
conflict.  To date, members of the armed forces and pro-Fujimori supporters 
question the validity of the PTRC‘s findings, making ongoing challenges to 
the methodology it employed to arrive at the victim count of nearly 70,000—a 
statistical method brought to the PTRC by expert Patrick Ball and previously 
used in the SATRC report.
128
  Attempts to initiate investigations into the 
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PTRC‘s use of funds continuously surface even today, enjoying wide press 
coverage, yet never resulting in substantial discovery of embezzlement and all 
the while implying the commissioners were corrupt.
129
 
During the PTRC‘s work from 2001 to 2003, media reports tended to 
focus on scandals and logistics, offering merely superficial information 
without digging into the deeper issues.  The beginning of the PTRC‘s 
formation was marked by reports on budget and salary.
130
  Headlines on the 
PTRC would read The Truth Commission Needs More than $5 Million for 
Work
131
 or Commissioners Start Work with 260,000-Dollar Deficit.
132
  A  
pro-Fujimori newspaper capitalized on the commissioners‘ salaries, disclosing 
each one‘s pay as listed on supposedly ―secret documents‖ of the PTRC‘s 
accounts that the newspaper‘s journalists had skillfully acquired.133  This in 
turn provoked responses from the commissioners, reassuring that these 
salaries were public information.
134
 
Similarly, during the middle of its work in 2002, the PTRC received 
strong criticism from the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana political 
party (APRA),
135
 headed by Alan García, who had been president during one 
of the periods (1985–1990) included in the PTRC work, and, at the time of 
publication, was serving as its president.  The APRA made public statements 
claiming that it would request a new truth commission, one ―that is authentic 
and impartially reviews cases of human rights violations in Peru without 
political connotations.‖136  APRA politician Mauricio Mulder further 
suggested that the commissioners resign.
137
  Incidentally, these remarks were 
produced around the time that the PTRC was investigating Alan García 
concerning his role during the violence.
138
  In response, a sort of ping-pong 
debate sparked in the media, in which various public figures, including the 
commissioners themselves, commented on the criticisms and spoke in favor 
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or against them.
139
  Needless to say, the public‘s attention was repeatedly 
focused on these media-driven controversies instead of on the issues at 
heart—the brutal killing of thousands of marginalized Peruvians as a result of 
a questionable national security campaign. 
Consequently, the PTRC report has yet to provide a common ground 
between conflicting sectors of society, resulting in polarization on key issues 
that continue to be the root cause of present-day conflicts.  At bottom, there is 
still a large majority of the population that believes the state violence was 
justified to defeat terrorism, reflecting a common sentiment that all the 
victims were terrorists
140
 (although the PTRC reported many massacres in 
which children and elderly were killed; moreover, many victims were killed 
outside of battle and without previous judicial determination of their 
affiliations
141
).  This attitude results in a continued high tolerance for state 
abuse and the failure to demand accountability.  Francisco Miró Quesada, 
director of local news group El Comercio, described Peru‘s penchant for 
authoritarianism in the following way: ―[D]ictatorship is a bad inheritance 
from traditional societies . . . .  Conflict is in the head of those who only 
understand democracy as a formal rather than real mechanism.  This happens 
because in the Peruvian state and in Peruvian society there exists in many 
sectors an authoritarian culture.‖142 
In fact, some academics have already noted this tendency in post-conflict 
settings and have suggested that theories of political transition have been 
limited by focusing only on ―particular conceptions of democracy.‖143  Not all 
governments tainted by human rights abuses may be so clearly labeled 
―authoritarian.‖  Rather, similar violations may be ―manifest in states that 
have experienced prolonged, structured, communal, political violence, even 
where the political structures could broadly be considered ‗democratic.‘‖144 
This observation is particularly clear in the case of Peru.  While certain 
sectors of Peruvian society are certain that Fujimori was a dictator, other 
sectors pardon his hardhandedness because they believe him responsible for 
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eradicating terrorism.
145
  As a result, Peru remains polarized not only on the 
issue of Fujimori, but on whether a hardhanded ruler is actually more 
effective than a democratic leader.  The failure to create a collective memory 
and consensus on what minimum human rights standards should apply when a 
government uses its coercive force against a civilian population arguably 
could be why social unrest in Peru still devolves into violent clashes with state 
security. 
In June 2009, indigenous communities in Bagua suffered a violent 
encounter with police forces, culminating in the death of nine civilians and 
twenty-four police officers, according to authorities, though native 
communities have claimed the civilian toll reached at least twenty-five.
146
  
After months of attempts at dialogue with the central government, indigenous 
rights group National Organization of the Amazon Indigenous People of Peru 
(AIDESEP) blocked a highway in the selva (jungle) as a sign of protest 
against legislative decrees it believed jeopardized indigenous rights to land 
and cultural identity.
147
  When the police acted on orders to clear the highway, 
freeing transit, violence broke out, ultimately provoking the deaths.
148
  
Commentators, including journalists, revisited the issue only recently raised 
by the PTRC: the lack of a common belief in the rights of all citizens before 
the state—even the historically marginalized and disenfranchised.  Journalist 
Guisella Vargas Ochoa wrote, ―the government needs to use more wisely 
tools that allow us to communicate in order to prevent or resolve the current 
crisis and to bring about unity among Peruvians, recognizing the importance 
of citizen participation in decision-making.‖149  Yet this communication 
failure was arguably exacerbated by the media‘s role in reporting on the 
growing tensions in Bagua, and undermined the space for dialogue.  Political 
analyst Mirko Lauer described the media scene in his local column: 
 
The Bagua tragedy instantly converted in[to] a war of 
different perspectives launched with fury and defiance, which 
the media has taken on with a similar attitude.  The 
government talks of an international conspiracy while the 
opposition makes accusations of planned genocide.  Up to 
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now, there is no really effective evidence for either of these, 
but they are still being repeated.
150
 
 
In fact, the international press started to shine light on the reality behind 
the events in Bagua.
151
  Foreign Affairs Minister José Antonio García 
Belaunde stated that the foreign press, such as the newspapers New York 
Times, Washington Post, and El Pais in Spain, began to dismiss false 
allegations that Bagua was part of a genocide conspiracy.
152
 
Thus, it could be argued that the failure of Peruvian society to reach a 
consensus regarding the role that the government and armed forces should 
assume during social conflict gives rise to continued conflicts.  Arguably, the 
PTRC‘s inability to really engage the media during its work—and the media‘s 
corresponding inability to capitalize on underlying rather than superficial 
issues—represents a failed opportunity.  Had there been more societal 
discussion about the tension between the State‘s national security issues and 
citizens‘ rights, then perhaps this could have led to greater understanding 
during future clashes between the state and the governed.  Because the media 
provide channels for carrying out debate on conflicting issues in polarized 
societies, the media have the power to mediate these difficult conflicts.  
Essentially, the critical role of the media here arises out of the fact that ―[i]n 
modern societies . . . public deliberation is (and probably must be) largely 
mediated, with professional communicators rather than ordinary citizens 
talking to each other and to the public through mass media of 
communications.‖153 
The burden of this obligation suggests that journalists are responsible for 
not only reporting information, but also processing it, as opposed to leaving it 
in crude form—they do not necessarily have free reign to say and report 
anything they want.  For example, how a story is ―framed‖ will largely 
determine its impact on the reader or viewer because it is ―the process by 
which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and 
constructs a political issue or public controversy.‖154  Here, media reporting 
does not consist of merely presenting the facts, but instead shaping the 
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parameters for interpreting the facts and events published for mass 
consumption.  The media must understand that ―[p]eople‘s reasoning about 
divisive political issues may be shaped by the mass media‘s depiction of the 
issues.‖155 
The importance of this process cannot be underestimated because it ―is 
essential to democracy, in order to ensure that the public‘s policy 
preferences—upon which democratic decisions are based—are informed, 
enlightened, and authentic.‖156  Seeing as the media has the power to shape 
public opinion, the media can serve to mitigate or provoke the extremes in 
polarized societies, and thus the reaction to transitional mechanisms such as 
truth commissions, trials, and reforms. 
For example, the media can just as easily ―demonise people and contribute 
to violence‖ as it can ―humanise opponents after a conflict.‖157  Whether 
intentionally or not, the way journalists frame the information they receive 
from news sources can drastically shape collective sentiments in tense 
environments, either easing longstanding strife or exacerbating it: 
 
[T]he choices journalists make about how to cover a story—
from the words, phrases, and images they convey to the 
broader ―angle‖ they take on a controversy—can result in 
substantially different portrayals of the very same event and 
the broader controversy it represents.  These alternative 
portrayals, or frames, can exert appreciable influence on 
citizens‘ perceptions of the issue and, ultimately, the opinions 
they express.
158
 
 
Ultimately the media can bridge the gap between ―others,‖ and overcome 
the ―us versus them‖ phenomena by ―graphically illustrat[ing] how much 
people have in common.‖159  In the case of Peru, much of the population still 
views the thousands of slain and disappeared victims—largely indigenous 
farmers—as terrorists deserving their punishment.160  By attempting to 
―humanize‖ this population, the media could assist in breaking down 
stereotypes and cultivating empathy and respect towards this underclass. 
The failure of the PTRC to engage the media more fully in a way that 
would offer new frames for understanding the conflict through a human rights 
lens amounts to a missed opportunity.  Greater discussion on this topic could 
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have helped strengthen a human rights culture and acted as a prophylactic 
against future abuses.  That is, when members of a society internalize the 
mores of individual rights and state accountability, then they are more likely 
to reject state political violence, while also demanding accountability 
measures.  Unfortunately, Peru‘s scant respect for the rule of law to date has 
made its society less amenable to domestic human rights trials, including that 
of Fujimori. 
C.  The Media and Trials 
The state initiated criminal proceedings against Fujimori on December 10, 
2007, after successfully winning its extradition request to Chile.
161
  Unlike 
with the work of the PTRC, this human rights trial attracted impressive media 
coverage that, in turn, generated elevated public interest.  Being one of the 
first presidents to stand trial in his home country, both national and 
international press closely followed the Fujimori trial proceedings.
162
  
Nationally, several major daily newspapers published either articles or small 
updates for each trial session—nearly every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday 
from December 10, 2007, until April 7, 2009. Similarly, televised news 
programs gave periodic updates, and one cable news channel even aired all 
161 trial sessions.
163
  When key witnesses testified, public television channels 
also broadcasted these hearings, and news analyses programs conducted 
related interviews with local experts on the proceedings.  Frequently, 
newspapers dedicated their front-page stories to Fujimori‘s criminal trial. 
Yet, a national survey conducted by local pollster Ipsos APOYO revealed 
that only 32% of the population believed the coverage was sufficient and 40% 
thought the coverage was insufficient.
164
  Most notable was that the  
state-owned channel failed to adequately cover the trial sessions, much less 
broadcast them live.
165
  Only a cable television channel, available to 
subscribers, aired all of the trial sessions,
166
 thus reaching a limited number of 
Peruvians around the country. 
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Significantly, the pro-Fujimori following—namely Fujimori‘s children 
and members of his political party, including incumbent members of 
Congress—repeatedly accused the local media of failing to publish objective 
reports.
167
  During the trial, Fujimori‘s lawyer, César Nakazaki, even claimed 
that the former president was the target of and long ago convicted in a ―media 
trial‖ that was, in turn, influencing the judges trying him.168  In contrast, an 
opinion poll showed that 41% of Peruvians believed the trial media coverage 
to be impartial and 13% considered it biased in Fujimori‘s favor.169  Yet, 
accusations by Fujimori‘s supporters (referred to as ―Fujimoristas‖) 
undoubtedly influenced the 33% who agreed that the coverage was biased 
against Fujimori.
170
 
This debate on media objectivity in Fujimori‘s trial resonates with an 
ongoing tension in post-conflict media reporting on the standard for 
objectivity.  Ultimately, while Fujimori indeed had a right to a fair trial that 
included a public hearing with impartial judges, if the media was reporting on 
the evidence brought against him, then it was inevitable that they could appear 
biased.  The evidence was damning.  Indeed, even before the PTRC wrote its 
report condemning Fujimori‘s role in perpetrating human rights abuses, 
national and international organizations issued scathing condemnations.
171
  
Following Fujimori‘s self-coup, the international community openly called 
into question his respect for democracy.
172
  Since then, major press agencies 
have called his presidency ―authoritarian‖ and suggested he had  
―near-dictatorial‖ tendencies.173  Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of 
Human rights has implicated Fujimori‘s complicity in the same human rights 
violations that formed the charges against him in his trial—the Barrios Altos 
and La Cantuta massacres.
174
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D.  Mitigating Sensationalization 
At the same time Fujimori supporters were saying that the media was 
biased against him, they were using the media to create their own distractions 
to the real issues at trial.
175
  In this way, they demonstrated one of the greatest 
challenges for the media in post-conflict settings with regard to 
sensationalization.  As seen in various transitional societies, some individuals 
belonging to one side of a past conflict either strategically or inadvertently 
dramatize conflict-related issues.  This situation can present serious 
difficulties for journalists who strive to adhere to the classic professional 
standard ―as defined by fairness, accuracy, balance, and detached, fact-based 
reporting.‖176  By not mediating the unrefined facts in an effort to stay neutral 
and fair, journalists show how ―the very reporting norms that seem most 
desirable actually limit [their] capacity . . . to challenge deceptions and lies 
when they occur.‖177 
For example, in 2002, Slobodan Milosevic, ex-president of the former 
Yugoslavia, was placed on trial in The Hague for alleged war crimes and 
crimes against humanity,
178
 including ethnic cleansing for killing 
approximately 250,000 Kosovar Albanians.  Yet despite such grave charges, 
he was able to captivate Serbian society with accusations that his trial 
signified a political prosecution.
179
  Milosevic was able to ―transform his 
identity as the accused and a prisoner into that of a hero.‖180  One Serb 
recounted that his mother had ―hated Milosevic more than anyone else‖ but 
then converted as she watched his trial, ―encourag[ing] him with ‗bravo‘ 
shouts, although she hated him for ten years.‖181  It was through the 
transparency of his trial‘s media coverage that Milosevic managed to 
reanimate past conspiracy theories and present himself as a hero.
182
  The fact 
that the media allowed Milosevic to broadcast his allegations, in the end, 
strengthened the support of his followers and kept alive societal divisions in 
Serbia, as seen when tens of thousands of supporters attended Milosevic‘s 
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funeral after he died on March 18, 2006, while imprisoned at The Hague.
183
  
Arguably, the media‘s failure to screen some of Milosevic statements, no 
doubt because they were merely reporting ―the facts,‖ potentially delayed 
societal reconciliation. 
Similar to Milosevic, Fujimori also increased his own popularity through 
a calculated use of the media coverage of his trial.  For example, on the first 
day of his human rights trial, the judges asked if he accepted the charges 
brought against him.  Fujimori gave a four-minute speech on how he had 
saved the country from terrorism, culminating in his energetic plea: ―I am 
innocent!‖184  This exclamation yielded ample coverage nationally and 
internationally and resulted in the creation of cell phone ringtones and music 
videos using Fujimori‘s proclamation as a theme song.185  Fujimori not only 
played on the resilient belief of a large portion of the population that his  
hardhanded approach to the war on terrorism saved the country, he also 
solidified this collective interpretation of the past.  Importantly, he achieved 
this influence only because the media did not provide a larger context to 
contest his claims.  One rarely sees reference to an important historical fact 
clarified by the PTRC: years of intelligence investigations initiated before 
Fujimori came to power ultimately led to the arrest of terrorist group leaders, 
and consequently the decline in violence.
186
  Thus, the media failed to raise 
awareness that Fujimori‘s hardhanded measures occurred after the terrorist 
threat to the nation had largely ended. 
At the same time, Fujimori and the Fujimoristas used the press during his 
human rights trial to distract the public with trivial matters, and thus drew 
attention away from evidence that might dissuade them from supporting 
Fujimori.  For example, Fujimori and his family frequently complained to the 
local media that abusive prison conditions were responsible for his 
deteriorating health.
187
  When Fujimori was diagnosed with a small outbreak 
of leukoplakia, a type of lesion characterized by white patches, a pro-Fujimori 
newspaper ran the headline Fujimori Has Cancer! Abusive Trial Kills Him 
Slowly on its front page.
188
  Yet, Fujimori was never diagnosed with cancer, 
and the press failed to inform the public that leukoplakia only causes cancer in 
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an estimated three percent of those who experience lesions.
189
  Fujimori‘s son, 
Kenji Fujimori, also told members of the press that his father suffered from 
―high arterial hypertension, bronchitis, acute lumbago [lower back pain], 
swelling in the legs, digestive disorders and new worrying symptoms,‖ 
supposedly as a result of his prison conditions.
190
  Yet in reality, the former 
president had daily access to an outdoor patio, could receive visits from 
anyone he approved, had an ample living area, television, and all the reading 
material he requested.
191
  These kinds of public relations maneuvers amount to 
―careful stage setting, scripting, and acting to create convincing images that 
often have little to do with the underlying reality of the situation,‖ essentially 
―pseudo event[s]‖ that create false truths.192 
On one occasion, Peru‘s then-Justice Minister Rosario Fernández was 
moved to publicly scold Fujimori‘s political supporters for their misleading 
statements to the press.  She ordered them to be ―more responsible in their 
declarations [to the press], because they are misinforming the population 
regarding former president Alberto Fujimori‘s legal and personal situation.‖193  
Yet, perhaps the responsibility for this misinformation belongs, in part, to 
journalists for failing to either filter any outrageous statements or to provide 
alternative views to counter them and provide the public with a more balanced 
view of the truth.  By merely ―reporting‖ what the Fujimoristas said, local 
journalists exacerbated the drama, and, consequently, the division among 
Peruvians.  Here they once again revealed a paradox of journalism by which 
―the more objective or fair reporters try to be, the more official bias they 
introduce into the news.‖194  By not screening out such sensationalization, 
journalists become complicit in distracting audiences from the real issues at 
hand.  They fall prey to this ploy to ―trivialize news content‖ to ―distract[] 
attention from any broad or enduring political significance the event may have 
had.‖195  If the information is ―inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or full of 
outright lies . . . even a rational public can be fooled.‖196  Unfortunately, the 
consequences are not just a harmful nuisance because such information can 
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mislead the public towards ―favoring policies that harm themselves and their 
neighbors, or policies that violate their deepest values.‖197 
In the end, the failure of the Peruvian journalists to mediate the 
Fujimoristas‘ sensationalism has meant that the journalists failed to address 
the ongoing public opinion that the alleged crimes were justified.  In October 
2007, a poll revealed that 78% of residents in Peru‘s capital city Lima 
approved of the former president‘s extradition home to face criminal charges 
of corruption and human rights violations.
198
  But in June 2008—six months 
after Fujimori‘s human rights trial began—another survey showed that while 
53% of Peruvians believed Fujimori was guilty of the charges he faced, 
almost 65% said they still approved of his government because they believed 
he was responsible for eradicating terrorism and ending the internal 
conflict.
199
  In this way, the trial coverage did not contest the idea that human 
rights violations are justified in national security situations.  On the contrary, 
the trial coverage has helped to increase Fujimori‘s image as the country‘s 
savior, and thus increased his popularity.  In fact, the sudden political 
prominence of his daughter Keiko Fujimori, who has been a member of 
Congress since 2006 and during the trial ascended the polls as the favorite 
potential 2011 presidential election candidate,
200
 may be directly linked to the 
Fujimoristas‘ manipulation of the media. 
IV.  BUILDING AN APPROACH TO THE MEDIA IN  
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESSES 
The media plays a central role in reconciliation processes that assure 
conflict resolution and prevention. Yet, a transition process does not begin 
with a whole new media system, but rather inherits whatever media 
institutions existed before and inevitably played a role during the period in 
question.  Thus, countries embarking on a transitional justice project must 
also inevitably consider how to address any long-term damage to national 
media institutions and cultures.  As one scholar observed: 
 
In post-conflict contexts where the society was torn asunder 
through words as well as other weapons, almost all stations 
are often affiliated with a highly partisan political party or a 
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local power.  Patterns of professional journalistic ethics and 
responsibility are often in decline and, as a result, the level of 
professionalism of local media outlets is often relatively low 
when measured against international standards.  This lack of 
professionalism further undermines any claim of 
independence that these local media outlets claim.
201
 
Certainly, journalists also are products of the conflict that a country has 
experienced.  The fact that journalists are often persecuted, threatened, or 
harmed during conflicts may very well affect their ability to have a neutral 
opinion, report objectively on their oppressors, or mitigate sensationalism 
from certain sectors.
202
  The process of transitional justice, including a truth 
commission and subsequent trials, may even represent a kind of ―victory‖ for 
them.  In this way, journalists may see this process as vindication of their 
views such that they become unwilling to offer other, opposing views.
203
 
This particular challenge was reported during Liberia‘s transitional justice 
period.  Despite the significant investment of resources in training journalists, 
it was still ―hard to tell when a story‖ on the Liberian truth commission or the 
Charles Taylor trial was ―news or opinion.‖204  Similarly, in Cambodia, the 
United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) confronted 
many difficulties when it attempted to rebuild the media institution after the 
Khmer Rouge regime collapsed in 1998.
205
  In particular, it was hard to undo 
the professional culture after years of state-controlled media that since 1975 
had instilled a habit of obedience, prohibited an independent journalist 
association, killed journalists, and generally discouraged a free press guided 
by codes of professional ethics.
206
  With minimal effective redress for libel 
and other civil offenses, local journalists lacked professional restraint and 
newspapers subsidized by powerful individuals would run ―wild headlines 
and unsourced stories—especially in the years of the coalition government 
from 1993 to 1997—[that] contributed to the political tension and 
fractionalisation.‖207 
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This situation raises the challenging question of whether certain protocols 
or guidelines should be established for the media operating in post-conflict 
settings.  As one advocate of this approach explains, ―[t]here must be a more 
systematic international approach to building or rebuilding the media 
environment in post-conflict societies.  It is no use promising vast sums of 
money for reconstruction and then moving on to . . . a different conflict zone 
six months later.  Building institutions is a long term commitment . . . .‖208  
The Institute on War and Peace Reporting has a set of ―six duties‖ for 
journalists covering conflict and peace.
209
  The list outlines that reporters, 
even in the face of the increased external pressures that come with war, must 
maintain standards such as professional research and balanced coverage.
210
  
But it goes further, highlighting the responsibility of reporters to cover the 
―trauma and the human stories of all the conflict‘s victims,‖ and that true 
balance requires a look at alternatives to war: ―We should report on the efforts 
of those working on peace and reconciliation every bit as much as those who 
exacerbate the conflict.‖211  The list of duties ends with a call for journalists to 
consider the impact of their work and the necessity to remain independent 
observers: ―We should always be aware that our reporting will affect the 
conflict and the lives of people in it.  We should be ever vigilant to avoid 
being used by one side or the other in their war efforts and to expose those 
attempts at media manipulation if so found.‖212 
Although related to war journalism, the same idea could apply to  
post-conflict settings.  In fact, a whole new genre of peace journalism or 
―conflict sensitive journalism‖213 has been developed ―to positively influence 
behavioral responses to conflict and shepherd in a new era of understanding, 
harmony, and security in conflict regions and broken societies across the 
world‖ and to foster tolerance and reconciliation.214  Communication scholar 
Bennett introduces the idea that journalists owe democracy a duty of social 
responsibility, guided by certain ―professional norms‖ that he defines as 
―those moral standards, codes of ethics, and guidelines about inserting one‘s 
voice and viewpoint into a story that enable journalists to make personal 
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decisions.‖215  Along these lines, in Bosnia the Office of the High 
Representative established 
 
an entire framework—an architecture of media law—with 
objective standards and a mechanism to determine whether a 
media violation occurred and the proper sanction for each 
violation.  The reform sought to put into place a new legal 
system with tribunals, enforcement mechanisms, and 
licensing agencies with the result that the media system 
would no longer be ―ethnically based and directly or 
indirectly associated to the main mono-ethnic political 
parties.‖216 
 
Yet, the attempt to create such standards raises the question: ―[H]ow can 
the processes of media restructuring and support take place in a way most 
consistent with international norms of freedom to receive and impart 
information?‖217  Indeed, the right to information that lays the foundation for 
freedom of the press arises out of international human rights law.
218
  The 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Media 
Regulatory Commission provoked international controversy because its ―plan 
to regulate the Kosovar press‖ appeared ―tantamount to censorship.‖219  Yet, 
the fact that journalists have been convicted of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity for their role in provoking political violence and assisting in 
repressive regimes
220
 raises the question of whether there should be stricter 
standards for the media.  Thus, a balance must be struck. 
In attempting to develop more systematic approaches to media reform, 
there may very well be more than one approach to prescribing media policies 
in post-conflict environments because the ―[s]pecific historic distinctions and 
peacekeeping needs will be of paramount importance indicating priorities.‖221  
Certainly, 
 
the previous regime type has a determinative influence both 
on the paths open for a transition country and on the tasks 
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that need to be addressed in order to reach democratic 
consolidation.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
tasks and paths open for the establishment of free and 
independent media could also be highly dependent upon the 
previous regime of a country in transition.
222
 
 
The landscape of preexisting media structures and those to come will 
hopefully inform what approach must be taken to post-conflict recovery 
schemes. 
Based on the overwhelming evidence of the media‘s unavoidable impact 
in conflict and post-conflict settings, we are convinced that the media can be 
turned into a real agent in bringing about sustainable peace.  However, for the 
media to really attain this potential, more specialized studies must be 
conducted to determine how to best implement in practice this theoretical 
approach.  To date, reports on support given to media reform still find that 
studies on media impact have been more focused on freedom and pluralism 
than on accountability, which has ―more or less been on the backburner.‖223  
But the slant of a journalist, even if unintentional, can be just as damaging as 
a dictator‘s fabrication; both can serve to mislead and ultimately form public 
opinion based on misinformation.  Here, that idea that the pen may be 
mightier than the sword fits quite literally into the context of journalism and 
war and post-conflict situations.  For that reason, we call on journalists and 
academics alike to further explore the particularities of the media‘s influence 
on conflict issues and its untapped potential to mend societal ruptures. 
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